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Sammendrag 
Liten vekt er hittil blitt lagt på betydningen av lønnsomhet i den empiriske litteraturen om 
bedriftsnedleggelsen. Vi anvender en foretaksdatabase med mikrodata for å identifisere i hvilken grad 
lønnsomhet kan forklare nedleggelse. Vi bruker disse data for å estimere en teoribasert økonometrisk 
modell, der nedleggelses- og investeringsbeslutningen er formulert som løsningen på et diskret-
kontinuerlig dynamisk programmeringsproblem. Vi estimerer modellen på seks industrinæringer og 
finner at økt lønnsomhet reduserer sannsynligheten for nedleggelse og at effekten er statistisk 
signifikant i alle næringer. Vi finner også at sannsynligheten for nedleggelse er persistent over tid, slik 
at det er den kumulative effekten av moderat høyere sannsynlighet over flere år, sammenlignet med 
gjennomsnittsbedriften, som forårsaker at bedriften legges ned. 
1 Introduction
According to standard economic theory, low (negative) protability is the key reason for
rms to exit. Until now, however, prot has not been a key variable in empirical research
on rm exit. For instance, Olley and Pakes (1996) estimate probit models of rm exit
using productivity, age and capital (not prot) as covariates, while Boeri and Bellmann
(1995) seek to explain rm exit also without using prot information. For the most part,
this observation reects the generally limited access to detailed information at the rm
level.
In the present paper, we use a recently established database of Norwegian manufac-
turing rms that provides detailed information on revenues and costs during the period
19932009. Some key characteristics of the data are i) 25 percent of rms that exited
experienced positive prots every year before exit, ii) there is no negative protability
shock immediately prior to exit (in fact, about 65 percent of the rms that exited had
positive prots in the year prior to exit), and iii) rms may continue production even
though they repeatedly experience negative prot 30 percent of the rm-year obser-
vations (one observation for each rm in each year) for non-exiting rms have negative
prot. These observations raise a number of key questions. First, what causes rms to
exit? Second, what characteristics distinguish rms that exit from those that continue
production? Third, is prot of key importance in explaining rm exit? The purpose of
this analysis is to employ a structural microeconometric model to provide answers to these
important questions.
We dene exit as the state in which production at a site has come to a permanent stop.
Note that a rm acquired by another rm is then not dened as having exited. Below we
use the terms exit and closedown interchangeably. If protability data are not available
for exit studies, there is a likelihood that the importance of some covariates may be over-
rated or even false. Alternatively, the estimated relationships between the probability of
exit and some of the covariates may be spurious because the partial e¤ect of protability
is not controlled for. The BoeriBellmann study mentioned earlier, for example, speci-
es di¤erent indicators for the business cycle, e.g., aggregate unemployment, and rather
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surprisingly concludes that cyclical factors do not a¤ect exit. In contrast, Salvanes and
Tveterås (2004) using Norwegian manufacturing data, conclude that exit rates increase in
severe downturns. In the latter study, protability is a covariate that signicantly lowers
the exit probability of rms. Although the di¤erence in business cycle e¤ects between the
BoeriBellmann and SalvanesTveterås studies may reect idiosyncrasies in their data,
the BoeriBellmann study may have drawn false conclusions largely because protability
was not included in the set of covariates.
In the present study, we build on economic theory to derive a theory-consistent econo-
metric model of rm exit. Needless to say, our choice of econometric model should reect
the key characteristics of the data. Therefore, in Section 2, we identify stylized facts about
the rms in our data set. These are rms in six export-oriented manufacturing indus-
tries: wood products, rubber and plastic products, metal products, machinery, electronic
equipment, and transport equipment. We employ this detailed Norwegian micro data set
of manufacturing rms to estimate their exit probability. Because the exit probability of
incumbent rms may di¤er systematically from that of new rms because of self-selection,
we restrict our attention to start-up rms during the data period employed.
We demonstrate in Section 2 that the adjustment of labor and materials from one year
to the next exhibits a di¤erent pattern than that for capital adjustment. This justies
modeling labor and materials di¤erently from capital. We also show that there is a high
degree of heterogeneity between rms in the same industry with respect to protability.
In particular, in all of the industries examined, there are rms with negative protability
and rms with positive protability in the same year. In the econometric model, we
account for this heterogeneity using rm-specic productivity terms.
In all industries we observe huge aggregated prot over time. This suggests the exis-
tence of market power, and we therefore assume imperfect competition (here modeled as
monopolistic competition) instead of competitive markets. We also observe that around
one-third of the rms that exited during our observation period always had positive prot.
Moreover, about three-fourths of the rms that exited in the observation period had a
positive operating surplus (revenue less variable costs) in the last year before they exited.
These two facts may indicate a weak relationship, if any, between protability and exit.
In Section 3, we introduce a model of production. In this model, each rm produces a
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variety of a di¤erentiated good under monopolistic price competition. Production requires
the input of labor, materials, and capital. While materials and labor are assumed to be
fully exible production factors, capital is quasi-xed, reecting the observed patterns
found in Section 2. The production function incorporates both neutral (Hicksian) and
nonneutral technological progress, and we assume these productivity terms are both rm
specic and time specic in order to take account of rm heterogeneity. Productivity is not
observable to the econometrician, and is decomposed into a rm-specic permanent e¤ect,
reecting productivity at the time the rm was established, and cumulative innovations
following the establishment of the rm.
In Section 4, we explain how we can use stochastic dynamic programming to derive how
much the rm will invest in each period of time. We extend the work of Rust (1994) by
allowing for a discrete decision variable (in our model, whether to exit), and a continuous
decision variable (in our model, investment). We also allow for both positive and negative
investment; if the rm sells its entire stock of capital we dene it as an exit. Under the
standard assumption that the state vector is Markovian, we derive the exit probability
function of the rm. This is a function of its scrap value (obtained if the rm exits) and
the net present value of the rm if it continues production for at least one more year and
makes optimal decisions now and in the future.
We present the empirical model that encompasses our behavioral model in Section 5.
There we discuss the stochastic specication of the model, explain how the net present
value of the rm can be approximated by a measure of protability and the stock of
capital, and provide guidelines for estimation. The main crux in estimating the model
is the nonobservability of the explanatory variable protability; this variable depends
on the current productivity of rms, which is represented by latent variables. Because
both the price and the investment decision depend on the productivity of the rm, there is
simultaneity between these decisions. However, the handling of latent variables makes the
empirical model too complicated to be estimated jointly by maximum likelihood, so we
propose a two-step procedure where in the rst step some of the parameters are estimated
by a simplied method.
We estimate the model in Section 6. We nd that for a given level of capital, improved
protability reduces the probability of exit, and that this e¤ect is statistically signicant
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in all industries. Moreover, ceteris paribus, a high level of capital increases the proba-
bility of exit. These ndings imply that in all industries, rms that exited during the
observation period have a substantially higher estimated exit probability than rms that
did not. The di¤erence between the estimated annual exit probabilities is also highly
persistent over time and is not limited to the year immediately prior to exit. In fact,
the exit probabilities do not increase sharply prior to exit, which reects that there are
no (negative) protability shocks in the last few years prior to exit. Therefore, it is the
cumulative e¤ect of the higher risk of exit over several years, compared with the average
rm, that causes exit.
In Section 6, we also run policy simulations by examining the e¤ects of a 10 percent
permanent increase in the real wage. We nd that for most of our industries, the sur-
vival probabilities decrease by roughly three percentage points after 10 years. We also
test whether ownership concentration and the gender composition of rm owners a¤ect
investment and exit. We nd i) a weak tendency that the exit probability of rms with
a high concentration of (individual) owners responds more strongly to changes in prot
than do rms that are more widely held, and ii) that there is no signicant e¤ect of gender
composition on the probability of exit. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
As discussed, prot has not been a key variable in empirical research on rm exit. Part
of this body of research has focused on descriptive statistics; see, e.g., Dunne et al. (1988)
for a study of exit rates, market shares and rm age for US manufacturing industries,
and Disney et al. (2003) for a study of exit rates in UK manufacturing. In addition,
there is an extensive literature on the application of reduced-form logit/probit models
and Cox proportional hazard models. For example, both Doms et al. (1995) and Mata
et al. (1995) nd that plant size is an important determinant of rm exit. In addition,
Pérez et al. (2004) conclude that the probability of exit is highest for small rms and that
export-intensive rms and R&D-intensive rms have a lower exit probability. In other
work, Agarwal and Audretsch (2001) and Klepper (2002) focus on the importance of age
and/or size, not prot, to explain rm exit.
Our study di¤ers from these along at least two dimensions. First, we employ data on
rm protability. Second, in contrast to the referred papers we derive a theory-consistent
model, which is the starting point for our structural econometric model. One advantage
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of structural models is that their coe¢ cients have a clear economic interpretation, and
thus policy simulations can be performed. In the present paper, we use our estimated
structural model to examine (in Section 6) how rms adjust to cost shocks, and how this
response has an impact on the exit probability. Such an exercise is hardly feasible when
using reduced-form models.
2 Data
Our main data source is a database from Statistics Norway based on register data, the
Capital Database, which covers the entire population of Norwegian limited liability com-
panies involved in manufacturing. The main statistical unit in this database is the rm,
where a rm is dened as the smallest legal unit comprising all economic activities en-
gaged in by one and the same owner. We analyze the survival and dynamics of new rms
as opposed to incumbent rms. We dene a rm as having exited in year t if it is recorded
in the Capital Database in year t  1, but not in year t, and is registered as either bank-
rupt or having closed down for an unspecied reason after t  1 according to the Central
Register of Establishments and Enterprises (REE).1 A rm may drop out of the Capital
Database without having exited. This may be the case if another form acquires the rm
or if it is reclassied to belong to another sector (i.e., outside manufacturing). To avoid
problems with the analysis of multiplant rms (which may close down only some of their
plants, see the discussion in Section 7), only single-plant rms (in the year of start-up)
are included in the analysis.
The Capital Database contains annual observations on revenue, wage costs, interme-
diate expenses (including energy), xed capital (tangible xed assets) and many other
variables for all Norwegian limited liability manufacturing rms during the period 1993
2009.2 The database combines information from two sources: (i) account statistics for all
Norwegian limited liability companies, and (ii) structural statistics for the manufacturing
sector. In general, all costs and revenues are in nominal prices, and incorporate taxes
and subsidies, excluding value-added tax (VAT). Labor costs include salaries and wages
in cash and kind, social security, and other costs incurred by the employer.
1There may be a delay in the registration of closedowns in the REE typically 1 or 2 years after the
rm drops out from the Capital Database.
2See Raknerud et al. (2004).
8
A unique feature of the database is that it contains net capital stock in both current
and xed prices at the rm level. The data set also distinguishes between two types
of capital goods: (i) buildings and land, and (ii) other tangible xed assets. The latter
consists of machinery, equipment, vehicles, movables, furniture, tools, etc., and is therefore
quite heterogeneous. The method for calculating capital stock in current prices is based
on combining gross investment data and the book values of the two categories of xed
tangible assets from the balance sheet; see Raknerud et al. (2007) for details.
Our econometric model contains only a single aggregate capital variable, constructed
using a Törnqvist volume index, where each type of capital is proportional to the sum
of: (i) the user cost of capital owned by the rm, and (ii) total leasing costs. This aggre-
gation corresponds to a constant-returns-to-scale CobbDouglas aggregation function for
di¤erent types of capital (see OECD, 2001).3
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the six industries examined in our study. These
are wood products (NACE 20), rubber and plastic products (NACE 25), metal products
(NACE 28), machinery (NACE 29), electronic equipment (NACE 3033) and transport
equipment (NACE 3435). As mentioned, we only consider rms that were established
during the observation period: a rm is dened to have entered the market in year t   1
if it was rst registered in the Capital Database in t  1 and was also recorded in year t.
We limit attention to new rms that operated for at least 2 years. In addition, we use the
rst observation year solely to obtain information about the initial capital stock of rms
(at the end of that year). This e¤ectively means that we only examine rms established
after 1993.
The rst and second columns in Table 1 detail the number of rms and the number
of rm exits by industry (for the entire data period 19942009), respectively. The third
column details the annual exit frequency, which is typically 78 percent. During the entire
observation period, about 25 percent of rms exited. The fourth column in Table 1 shows
the average number of man-years in the rm entry year. The value is typically around
3Formally, the aggregate capital stock is calculated using the Törnqvist volume index Kit =
(Kbit)
(Koit)
(1 ), where Kbit and K
o
it are the stocks of buildings and land (b) and other tangible xed
assets (o), respectively. Further, v =
P
itR
b
it=
P
it(R
b
it + R
o
it), where R
k
it = (r + k)K
k
it; k = b; o is the
annualized (user) cost of capital (including leased capital). In the latter expression, r is the real rate of
return, which we calculate from the average real return on 10-year government bonds over the period
19942009 (4 percent), and k is the median depreciation rate obtained from accounts statistics; see
Raknerud et al. (2007) for details.
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15, except for transport equipment where the mean is 43. The corresponding median
values are, however, much lower; between 3 and 6. Thus, most rms are small  this
is a feature typical of Norwegian manufacturing. They are also usually characterized by
having a high ownership concentration an issue we return to in Section 6. Firms in
these six industries compete in international markets. We therefore follow the standard
assumption in the international trade literature of imperfect competition, here specied
as monopolistic competition. The basic premise is that rms have some degree of market
power, yet there are so many rms in the industry that it is reasonable to assume that
each rm neglects that its choice of price has an impact on the demand curve of its
competitors.
Standard economic theory suggests that prot is (much) larger under imperfect com-
petition (price exceeds marginal cost) than under perfect competition (price equal to
marginal cost). As an informal test of our market structure assumption (monopolistic
competition), we calculated wage costs, capital costs and prot aggregated over all rms
in all periods (for each industry), and divided each by aggregate value added. Table 1
provides the corresponding shares.4 We nd that prots make up between 10 and 18
percent of value added in the six industries.5 Because perfect competition can be seen as
a special case of the monopolistic competition model (innitely large demand elasticity
and a homogeneous good), in Section 6.1 we use our estimates to provide more evidence
that perfect competition is not an adequate description of the market structure.
4We calculate capital costs using the standard user-cost formula with an interest rate equal to the
average yield on 10-year government bonds (see also footnote 3).
5According to the seminal study by Mehra and Prescott (1985), risk aversion explains at most 1
percentage point of the US equity premium, that is, the di¤erence between the return on equities and
risk-free bonds. This suggests that correcting for risk aversion will not alter the general picture suggested
in Table 2.
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In Figure 1, we examine how the use of the three production factors, labor (measured
by man-hours), materials (intermediate inputs, including energy) and capital change over
time. For each factor of production and each rm in each year, we rst calculate the use
of a factor in year t (t = 1995; :::; 2009) relative to the use of this factor in year t  1. In
Figure 1, the horizontal axis measures the log of this ratio, that is, the relative change in
the use of inputs, while the vertical axis measures frequency. As shown, the graphs for
man-hours and materials are almost identical and resemble the normal distribution. At
rst glance, the graphs may give the impression that changes in man-hours and materials
follow each other almost perfectly. There is, however, substitution possibilities between
these two inputs: when comparing (for each industry), the within-rm variation in the
(log of the) materialslabor ratio to the within-rm variation in the (log of) man-hours,
we nd that this ratio is around 50 percent. If materials and labor were used in a xed
ratio specic to each rm, this ratio should have been zero. (This would also hold if
the rm-specic ratios change proportionally over time for all rms.) In Section 3, we
therefore assume substitution possibilities between labor and materials.
Figure 1 also depicts the log of changes in the stock of capital. This graph has some-
what thicker tails than those for man-hours and materials. The thicker tails mean that
observations with large (negative or positive) changes are more frequent. Moreover, the
thicker right tail the distribution is skewed to the right reects the intermittent and
lumpy nature of investment in Norwegian manufacturing; see Nilsen and Schiantarelli
(2003).
We see that net investment takes negative values for roughly 50 percent of the ob-
servations. A rm with negative net investment has a lower acquisition of capital than
depreciation. In particular, net investment may be strongly negative because of the sale
of capital; in our data, the value of annual sales of capital amounts to about 10 percent of
gross (annual) investment, which is substantial relative to aggregate depreciation. As dis-
cussed in Section 3, this distinctive pattern of investment calls for capital to be modeled
di¤erently than labor and materials.
In our data set, a substantial share of the observations has negative protability. This
is the case both for i) rms that did not exit during the observation period (nonexiting
rms), and ii) rms that did exit during the observation period (exiting rms). In
12
Figure 1: Distribution of log of annual changes in capital, man-hours and materials.
Kernel density estimates
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Figure 2: Distribution of share of observations (for each rm) with positive prots
14
fact, almost 20 percent of the rm-year observations for nonexiting rms (one observation
for each operating rm in each year), and more than 25 percent of the observations of
the exiting rms, have negative operating surplus. The corresponding values for prot,
that is, operating surplus less capital costs, are 30 percent for nonexiting rms and 35
percent for exiting rms. Our model should therefore allow for negative protability, in
particular, negative operating surplus.
The share of observations with negative protability may be unevenly distributed over
rms. For example, some rms may have no, or just a few, observations with negative
protability, whereas others may have several observations with negative protability.
Figure 2 shows, for nonexiting and exiting rms, how the observations with positive prof-
itability are distributed over rms. We construct each curve as follows. For each rm, we
nd its share of observations with positive protability, henceforth termed the positive
protability share. We then sort rms by their positive protability share (from 0 to
1), and group rms with the same positive protability share together. In Figure 2, the
horizontal axis measures the cumulative share of rms while the vertical axis measures
the positive protability share. Each curve consists of a number of steps. The length of
each step indicates the share of rms with the same positive protability share, and the
height of the step depicts the positive protability share.
Figure 2 shows that when measuring protability by prot, about 22 percent of the
exiting rms have a positive protability share of zero, that is, all their observations have
negative prot. The corresponding gure for nonexiting rms is 12 percent. Moreover,
almost 45 percent of the exiting rms have a positive protability share that is 0.5 or
lower, i.e., at least half of their observations have negative prot. We also see that about
25 (45) percent of the exiting (nonexiting) rms have a positive protability share of 1,
that is, they have positive prot in every year.
Figure 2 gives a mixed picture of the importance of protability relative to exit. On
the one hand, a substantial share of the exiting rms (25 percent) always have positive
prot. Moreover, most exiting rms are protable in the last few years before the exit.6
This may indicate that the relationship between protability and exit is weak. On the
6The share of exiting rms with positive operating surplus 3 years, 2 years and 1 year prior to exit is 86,
82 and 75 percent, respectively. The corresponding shares with positive prots are about 10 percentage
points lower.
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other hand, the graph of nonexiting rms lies above that of the exiting rms, reecting
that the former on average have higher protability. The area between the two graphs
is considerable, suggesting that there is a negative relationship between protability and
exit. We return to the question of whether there is a signicant relationship between
protability and exit in Section 6.
3 Short-run factor demand
We consider an industry with monopolistic competition. Each producer faces a demand
function of the following form:
Qit = tP
 e
it (1)
where Qit is the output of rm i at time t, Pit is the output price and t is an exogenous
demand shift parameter characterizing the size of the market. Furthermore, e > 1 is the
absolute value of the direct price elasticity. The price elasticity is common to all rms
and constant over time.
Let Mit denote materials input, Lit labor input, and Kit capital. We assume that the
use of materials and labor are determined at the beginning of each time period (variable
inputs), whereas capital services in year t are determined by the capital stock at the end
of t  1, Ki;t 1. However, through investment in period t, the capital stock at the end of
period t increases (capital is quasi-xed see discussion below). The production function
of producer i is assumed to be:
Qit = AitK

i;t 1 [M

it + (wtLit)
]

 ,  < 1 (2)
where the elasticity of scale is equal to "+ , the elasticity of substitution between mate-
rials and labor is 1=(1 ), and wt is a time-varying distribution parameter. Our produc-
tion function can be seen as a nested CobbDouglas function dened over capital and a
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate over labor and materials. The speci-
cation (2) allows for heterogeneity in productivity across rms: Hicks-neutral changes in
e¢ ciency are picked up by Ait, which may shift over time and vary across rms, whereas
a positive change in wt can be interpreted as a labor-augmenting innovation. Thus, wt
captures the feature that the skill composition of labor typically changes over time. While
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Lit is the use of labor as measured in man-hours, wtLit should be interpreted as the use
of labor measured in e¢ ciency units.
Let qit = (qMt; qLit) be a vector of the unit price of materials and labor, respectively.
The unit price of labor is rm specic, which may reect that the composition of the
di¤erent types of labor varies across rms. Producers are assumed to be price takers in
all factor markets. Using Shephards lemma, the short-run cost function is:
C(qit; Ki;t 1; Qit) = cit

Qit
AitK

i;t 1
 1
"
(3)
where
cit = [(qLit=wt)
% + q%Mt]
1
% , % =

  1 . (4)
Here, cit is a rm-specic price index of variable inputs, i.e., derived from the CES ag-
gregate of labor and materials. Note that cit depends on the distribution parameter wt,
where qLit=wt is the e¢ ciency-corrected price of labor.
The short-run optimization problem of rm i in the beginning of period t, when the
producer knows qit; t, Ait and wt (and also e, ;  and " ), is to choose for a given
stock of capital the price that maximizes operating surplus:
it = max
Pit
(
tP
1 e
it   cit

tP
 e
it
AitK

i;t 1
 1
"
)
(5)
where tP 1 eit = PitQit (from (1)) is the revenue of the rm. Solving the resulting rst-
order condition gives the following equations for revenue Rit = PitQit and short-run factor
costs qMtMit and qLitLit:
24 lnRitln(qMtMit)
ln(qLitLit)
35 = 11 lnAit+
24 2 02   % 0
2   % %
35it+11 lnKi;t 1+%
24 0ln qMt
0
35+1 1
e  1 lnt
(6)
where 1 is a vector of ones,
it =

ln cit; ln(qLit=wt)
0
(7)
and
1 =
(e  1)
("+ e  e") > 0; 2 =
 "(e  1)
("+ e  e") < 0: (8)
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We can see that 1 is a common coe¢ cient of the Hicks-neutral e¢ ciency term lnAit
in all three equations in (6). On the other hand, a change in the rm-specic price index
of variable inputs, cit; will have a di¤erent impact on revenues (2) than on factor costs
(2  %). Note that an increase in wt (for given qLit) increases revenue Rit because 2 < 0;
see (6) and (8). An increase in wt has no direct impact on material costs, see (6), but
will through a drop in the rm-specic price index cit (see (4)), increase material costs if
2 < %, see (6). An increase in wt has an identical indirect e¤ect, through cit, on labor
costs as on material costs (2  %), but has in addition a direct impact on labor costs (%).
If % > 0, an increase in wt will therefore lower the short-run cost share of labor, i.e., the
innovation is labor saving.
If the demand parameter t is allowed to be rmtime specic, denoted it, the system
(6) is unaltered except that Ait is replaced by Ait = 
1=(e 1)
it Ait: Thus, neutral e¢ ciency
shocks (Ait) and (idiosyncratic) demand shocks (it) enter the two alternative systems in
a completely symmetric way, and we would not be able to distinguish between them in
the empirical analysis. Therefore, Ait may capture both technology shocks and demand
shocks, but we will still refer to Ait as e¢ ciency. This should be kept in mind when
interpreting the results reported in Section 6.
The operating surplus it dened in (5) has the closed form:
it =

exp
 
2, 0

it

  exp   2   %, 0 it + % ln qMt
  exp   2   %, % itA1it  1e 1t K1i;t 1
 itK1i;t 1 (9)
where it is dened by the identity in (9), that is, it = it=K
1
i;t 1. To ensure that
optimization with respect to capital is well dened, we need to have 1 < 1. (Our model
meets this requirement; see below.)
4 Exit and investment dynamics
The producer invests in capital during year t and the purchase price of a unit of capital
is qKt. We deate all prices by the same index, so that in any time period one dollar of
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any cost component has the same value as one dollar of a revenue component. (If prot
components are deated by di¤erent indexes, nominal prot and deated prot may have
di¤erent signs.) We use the price index of capital as the deator to reect the opportunity
cost of investment. Therefore, without loss of generality, we can normalize the real price
of capital by setting qKt  1 in all time periods.
We follow the standard assumption that it takes one period until the stock of capital
adjusts. If there were no costs of adjusting capital, then the stock of capital would be
found from maximizing:
it   (r + )Ki;t 1 (10)
with respect to Ki;t 1, where it is a function of Ki;t 1 given by (9), and (r + )Ki;t 1 is
the (neoclassical) user cost of capital (r is the real interest rate and  the depreciation
rate). Below, we refer to the solution of this problem as the stock of frictionless capital,
Ki;t 1.
We now address the more realistic case where there are costs of capital adjustment.
In each period, the rm makes an investment decision. Investments can be positive or
negative. In particular, if the rm decides to exit during year t, it will sell its remaining
stock of capital at the end of year t; It =  (1  )Kt 1.
Let the choice variables be (It; zt), where It is investment and zt is a dummy variable
that takes a value of one if the rm continues to operate throughout year t, and zero if
the rm exits during year t. We take the Markovian discrete choice model of Rust (1994)
as the starting point and assume that the period t utility from the choice (It; zt); given
the state vector St = (t; Kt 1), can be written as:
u(St; It; zt) + "(zt) (11)
where u(St; It; zt) is operating surplus minus capital expenditures and "(zt) is a random
component associated with the discrete choice zt. By denition we have:
u(St; It; zt) =

t   c(It) zt = 1
t   c( (1  )Kt 1) zt = 0 (12)
where c(It) is the total cost of capital. Below, we assume that there is only one type of
capital adjustment cost, namely, that the resale price of capital is lower than the purchase
price of capital, i.e., costly reversibility (see Abel and Eberly, 1996). Then, c(It) is weakly
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convex with a kink at zero.7 Operating surplus t follows from St and is therefore not
a¤ected by zt and It. If zt = 0, t is the terminal period and the rm sells its remaining
capital stock, It =  (1   )Kt 1; and obtains a scrap value,  c( (1   )Kt 1); at the
end of the year.
Following Rust (1994), we assume that the state vector St is Markovian with transi-
tion probability g(dSt+1jSt; It) and that "(z) = ("(0); "(1)) has a bivariate extreme value
distribution with scale parameter  and location parameters z = (0; 1):
8
h(") =
Y
z2f0;1g
 expf "(z) + z)g exp f  expf "(z) + zgg . (13)
Further, the rms choice of whether to continue production, and if so, how much to
invest, follow from the solution of the Bellman equation:
V (St; "t) = max
zt; It

u(St; It; zt) + "(zt) +
1
1 + r
Et [V (St+1; "t+1)]

. (14)
The value function V (St; "t) is characterized in Proposition 1, which is an extension of
the discrete choice model in Rust (1994), that is, we allow for a discrete and a continuous
decision variable.
Proposition 1 Assume (11)-(13) and that St is Markovian with transition probability
g(dSt+1jSt; It): Then the expected net present value of the rm is:
V (St; "t) = max
zt2f0;1g
[t + v(St; zt) + "(zt)] (15)
where
v(St; 0) =  c( (1  )Kt 1) (16)
and
v(St; 1) = max
It

 c(It) + 1
1 + r
 (17)Z 
t+1 +
1

ln [exp( c( (1  )Kt) + 0) + exp(v(St+1; 1) + 1)]

g(dSt+1jSt; It)

:
Finally, the exit probability is given by:
P (zt = 0jSt) = 1
1 + exp f  [ c( (1  )Kt 1)  v(St; 1) + 0   1]g
: (18)
7An alternative assumption is that the total cost of capital also includes resources to adjust to a higher
stock of capital. Under the standard assumption that this type of cost of adjustment is decreasing in the
initial stock of capital (for a given level of investment), see Abel and Eberly (1994), all our results apply.
8Because E("(z)  z) =  where  is Eulers constant, we have E("(z)) = ( + z)= .
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The proof is in Appendix A.
v(St; 1) can be interpreted as an expression for the net present value of the rm if it
does not exit in the current period (zt = 1) and makes optimal investment decisions now
(It) and in the future:
v(St; 1) = max
It

 c(It) + 1
1 + r
Et [V (St+1; "t+1)]

:
We show in Appendix A that @v(St; 1)=@Kt 1  0, that is, the value function is
increasing in the current stock of capital. Using a similar proof, we can also show that
if g(dSt+1jS 0t; It) stochastically dominates g(dSt+1jSt; It) for all St = (t; Kt 1) and S 0t =
(0t; Kt 1) with 
0
t > t,
9 then @v(St; 1)=@t  0. We will use these two properties of
v(St; 1) when we discuss the sign of parameters in the econometric exit model; see Section
6.2.
5 Stochastic specication and identication
The production model We now formulate an empirical model that encompasses our
structural model. We rst consider the empirical implications of (17) with regard to the
investment dynamics. For an operative rm, Iit will be the maximizer of (17). According
to Bloom et al. (2007), if i) rms maximize the expected net present value of prot, ii)
adjustment costs are weakly convex, and iii) it (= it=K
1
i;t 1) is a Markovian stochastic
process, then (conditional on survival) the actual capital stock Ki;t 1 and the frictionless
capital stock Ki;t 1 (see above) have the same long-run growth rate:
lnKi;t 1 = lnKi;t 1 + error
where the error term is stationary. Note that all three assumptions are in accordance
with our structural model. It can be shown that:
lnKi;t 1 = a lnAit +

c; 0

it + t (19)
where t is a time-varying intercept and:
a =
e  1
   e+ "+ e  "e (20)
c =  "a.
9That is, G(St+1jS0t)  G(St+1jSt) for any St+1, where G(St+1jSt) is the cumulative density function
(c.d.f.) corresponding to the probability density function (p.d.f.) g(St+1jSt). In our model, this means
that a higher current prot t uniformly shifts the c.d.f. of the next years prot, t+1, rightwards.
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As a rst-order approximation of the capital formation process of a rm, we estimate
a linear equilibrium correction model with (19) as the equilibrium level, conditional on
zit = 1. That is:
 lnKit = (  1)
 
lnKi;t 1   lnKi;t 1

+ eKit if zit = 1 (21)
where  is an unknown coe¢ cient and eKit is a white noise error term. Note that zit is
an endogenous variable that is simultaneously determined with Ki;t 1. Hence, we cannot
estimate (21) separately from (18).
Next, let:
yit = (logrevenue, logmaterial costs, loglabor costs, logcapital)0
be the vector of observed variables corresponding to the vector of theoretical variables
(lnRit, ln(qMtMit), ln(qLitLit); lnKit)
0. We assume that the observed variables are identi-
cal to the corresponding variables in the system of structural equations (6), except for the
additive white noise error terms, eit =

: eRit, eMit, eLit, eKit
0
, which are assumed
to be normally distributed with mean zero and unrestricted covariance matrix e. Com-
bining (6), (19) and (21), and assuming that the rm enters the sample at t = 1 and  i
is the last year rm i is observed (hence, zit = 1 for t = 1; :::;  i), we obtain:
yit =
26664
e1e1e1
(1  )ea
37775 ait+
2664
2 0
2   % 0
2   % %
(1  )c 0
3775it+
2664
1
1
1

3775 lnKi;t 1+dt+eit for t = 1; :::;  i
(22)
where (e1; ea) = ek(1; a) and ait = lnAit=ek for an arbitrary proportionality factor ek, and
dt is a vector of variables and parameters that only depends on t (not i).
We should note that the rst three equations in (22) are identical to the equations in
(6) but are augmented with noise terms. Thus, whereas the solution to (6) corresponds
to an ex ante production plan that is based on the information available to the rm
at the beginning of t, the ex post realizations, i.e., the data, are also determined by
other (unpredictable) factors, for example, measurement errors, new information obtained
during the year, and optimization errors.
We cannot identify 1 and a because lnAit is unobserved: (22) is observationally
equivalent for any two values of ek. The parameters (e1; ea) are identied from the sto-
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chastic assumptions we make about ait. We assume that:
ait = ai;t 1 + it, t = 2; :::;  i
ai1  IN (0; a); it  IN (0; 1) : (23)
The variable ai1 represents the productivity of rm i in its start-up year relative to the
average productivity of all new rms in that year, and the variance a of ai1 characterizes
the cross-sectional heterogeneity across rms in their rst observation year. Observed pro-
ductivity di¤erences between operative rms in any subsequent year is the result of initial
heterogeneity, ai, cumulated innovations,
P
t=2 it, and self-selection (the most productive
rms survive). To obtain identication, both the initial value of ai1 and the subsequent
innovations it must have zero mean since any nonzero mean will be indistinguishable
from the industry-wide intercept dt in (22). Moreover, the variance of the innovation it
is set to one to obtain identication of (e1; ea).
In (23) we have assumed that ait is a random walk. We test the random walk assump-
tion by allowing an AR(1) structure in (23): ait = 'ai;t 1 + it. Using a likelihood ratio
test, we cannot reject at the 5 percent level of signicance that ' is one. The assump-
tion of a random walk, which is consistent with Gibrats law that rm growth rates are
independent of rm size,10 is therefore retained throughout this paper.
The exit decision Assume that:
 c( (1  )Ki;t 1) = s(1  )Ki;t 1; s  1: (24)
The rationale behind (24) is that upon selling capital, the rm may not obtain the pur-
chase price of capital (which in the present analysis equals one by normalization). Put
di¤erently, markets for old capital may be imperfect, or there may be large transaction
costs, that is, s < 1. For parts of the capital stock there may even be no market (i.e., zero
price) because of, for example, asymmetric information. In that case, the rm will face
cleanup costs when the old capital is removed from the production site. The special case
s = 1 corresponds to the neoclassical theory of investment. We now discuss how to nd
the function v(St; 1) in (17). One possibility is to specify the parametric forms of c(It)
10The empirical literature suggests that Gibrats law is only valid for large- and medium-sized rms.
The validity of Gibrats law for smaller rms appears to depend on whether the analysis is restricted to
surviving rms; see Sutton (1997) and Caves (1998) for a discussion.
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and g(dSt+1jSt; It) in (17) and then solve for v(St; 1). In general, we do not know these
functions. In fact, one must choose very specic functions to be able to solve (17) and the
chosen parametric forms may be bad approximations of the true forms. An alternative
approach is to approximate v(St; 1) directly. We chose the latter approach because it
provides greater exibility in tting the data. We approximate v(St; 1) by means of a
sum of power functions:
v(St; 1) ' 0 + 1;it + 1;kKi;t 1 + 2;it + 2;kKki;t 1 + ;kit Kki;t 1. (25)
When  = k = 2 and  = k = 1, (25) is a second-order Taylor expansion. However,
much more exibility is obtained by letting these coe¢ cients be free parameters. In
practice, it is not possible to accurately estimate all the coe¢ cients in (25), and we will
therefore choose which terms to include based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC).
An important feature of our approach is that the state variable it is derived from
our theoretical model: it = it=K
1
i;t 1, where it dened in (9) is the rms operating
surplus under the assumption of no uncertainty and no decision errors in the short-run
optimization. Because it is not observable to the econometrician, neither is it. This
represents the main challenge for estimating the model: it is a latent state variable.
it can be estimated from the rst three elements of yit, that is, observed revenue
less the two observed cost components of operating surplus. However, this observational
counterpart of it is contaminated by white noise error terms, ejit (j = R;L;M). In
particular, the observed operating surplus may be negative, which is in contrast to it.11
In addition, there is a selection problem because yit is observed conditional on zit = 1.
Our estimation method will take both these concerns into account.
Above, we implicitly assumed that "(z) is drawn independently across rms. More
exibility is allowed by letting z in (18) be random coe¢ cients that are common across
rms, but that vary randomly from year to year; zt. Formally, zt is included in the state
vector, that is, Sit = (it; Ki;t 1; 0t; 1t). In our empirical model, (0t; 1t) are treated as
xed parameters to be estimated.
Estimation We rst consider the estimation of % and wt. From (6) we have:
ln

qLitLit
qMtMit

=  % lnwt + % ln

qLit
qMt

+ eLit   eMit: (26)
11This follows from a well-known property of the (nested) CobbDouglas production function.
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We can utilize (26) to obtain simple regression estimates of % and wt: Next, we intro-
duce bit by replacing % and wt in it; see (7), with their estimated values obtained from
the regression, (b%; bwt). Hence, bit is dened as:
bit =
24 ln h(qLit=bwt)b% + qb%Mti 1b%
ln(qLit= bwt)
35 :
It is now clear that we can identify 2, % and 1 (cf. (22)) because the components ofbit, as well as lnKit, are observed regressors. However, we cannot identify 1 or a, but
only (e1; ea) = ek(1; a). Moreover, from the expression 2 =  "(e   1)=(" + e   e"),
see (8), we see that we cannot identify both " and e. To obtain identication of " and
e, we need to impose an additional condition. For example, if markets are assumed
competitive, that is, e!1, then 2 =  "=(1  ") and 1 = =(1  "), so both " and 
are identied. Alternatively, we can assume that the elasticity of scale is "+ = 1. Then,
2=1 =  "=(1  "), so " is identied and then e follows from 2.
Given the estimates b% and bit obtained in the rst step of the estimation, our data
on rm i can be seen as the realization of a stochastic process (yi1; :::;yi i), where  i  T
is the stopping time and T is the last observation year, i.e., 2009, and we have assumed
for simplicity of notation that the rm enters at t = 1. The reason for stopping is either
censoring or exit: in the latter case, zi; i+1 = 0. Note that zit = 1 for t   i, while
zi; i+1 = 0 (rm has exited) or zi; i+1 = 1 (rm is censored). By a standard factorization
(see Billingsley, 1986) the log p.d.f. of (yi1; :::;yi i ;  i = k; zi; i+1 = j) can be written as:
lnP (zi2 = 1; :::; zik = 1; zi;k+1 = jjyi1; :::;yik) + ln f(yi1; :::;yik) (27)
where f(yi1; :::;yik) is the density of (yi1; :::;yik) when k is xed, i.e., not a stopping time.
To calculate ln f(yi1; :::;yik), our model can be cast in a state space form with yit
as the observation vector and ait as the only latent variable. Then, ln f(yi1; :::;yik) can
be calculated by standard methods from the one-step- ahead predictions and prediction
variances of the state vector (see Shumway and Sto¤er, 2000). To obtain analytical
derivatives, we utilize a decomposition of ln f(yi1; :::;yik), which is well known from the
EM-algorithm; see Koopman and Shephard (1992).
As discussed above, the explanatory variable it in the exit model is not observable
(to the econometrician) but depends on the latent variable ait, as seen from (9). Hence, it
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Table 2: Estimates of loading coe¢ cients. The standard errors (in parentheses) are
obtained from the inverse Hessian of the log-likelihood function
Industry Directly identied coe¢ cients Derived estimates assuming:
e =1 "+  = 1
1 2  % "  a "  e a
Wood products :12 (:01)  :56 (:12) :73 (:13) :26 :36 :10 :73 :79 :21 1:83 :25
Plastic products :18 (:01)  :85 (:12) :77 (:13) :30 :46 :16 :68 :73 :27 2:67 :35
Metal products :18 (:01)  :39 (:11) :72 (:11) :35 :28 :11 :77 :72 :28 1:67 :22
Machinery :13 (:01)  :30 (:11) :72 (:11) :22 :23 :04 :80 :84 :16 1:32 :15
Electrical eq :14 (:01)  :77 (:21) :70 (:11) :28 :43 :08 :69 :83 :17 2:08 :28
Transport eq. :24 (:01)  1:15 (:32) :77 (:11) :37 :53 :10 :65 :82 :18 2:74 :34
is necessary to integrate by Monte Carlo methods over ait given (yi1; :::;yik); which is
normally distributed, to obtain the rm-year- specic exit probability P (zi2 = 1; :::; zik =
1; zi;k+1 = jjyi1; :::;yik). More details about the estimation are in Appendix B, where we
outline the maximum likelihood algorithm that we have implemented in GAUSS.
6 Results
6.1 Estimates of structural coe¢ cients
In the empirical model, 1 is the coe¢ cient of lagged capital, lnKi;t 1, in the equations
for revenues, material costs and labor costs; see (22). We can identify this (composed)
coe¢ cient, which, because of the log-linear form of our model, is the elasticity of an
operating surplus factor (revenue, material costs or labor costs) with respect to the capital
stock. The estimates of 1 are depicted in the rst column of Table 2, and they vary
between 0.12 and 0.24. The relatively low values imply considerable curvature in the
prot function. In contrast, Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) nd an elasticity of prot
with respect to the capital stock of 0.59 for US manufacturing rms. The di¤erence
may reect that Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) assume price-taking behavior, whereas
we allow rms to face downward-sloping demand curves (monopolistic competition). The
speed of adjustment of the log of capital toward the equilibrium level lnKit; that is, (1 ),
is moderate. The estimates of  vary from 0.70 to 0.77, which indicates a slow adjustment
toward the frictionless capital stock Kit and may also reect lumpy investment; see the
discussion in Section 2.
As mentioned in Section 2, perfect competition is a special case in our model. We
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obtain perfect competition by letting the demand elasticity e in (1) approach innity. For
this limiting case, we have 2 =  "=(1  ") and 1 = =(1  "); see the discussion after
(26). Hence, we now obtain an estimate of "; and this estimate varies between 0.23 and
0.53; see Table 2. We also obtain an estimate of ; which varies from 0.4 to 0.16. Hence,
the estimate of the long-run scale elasticity " +  is in the range of 0.3 to 0.6, which is
much lower than most estimates of the scale elasticity as they are typically around one.
We believe our low estimate reects that the imposed assumption of a competitive market
is not valid; see the discussion in Section 2.
Another special case is obtained by imposing a long-run scale elasticity of one. Then
the estimate of " is roughly around 0.75 (see Table 2), which is close to the ratio between
labor costs and value added in our data set; see Table 1. In this special case, we also
obtain an estimate of e, which varies from 1.3 to 2.7  ; this is consistent with a high
degree of market power and the large prot shares reported in Table 1. We also obtain an
estimate of a: This estimate, which is an elasticity, is low (0.2 to 0.3), implying a weak
link between technological improvement and investment.
The estimates of % in Table 2 lie between 0.2 and 0.4. Note that 1  % is the elasticity
of substitution between labor and materials, which is estimated to be small in our data.
These estimates may be plausible as they are roughly in line with the corresponding
parameters in the large-scale computable general equilibrium model of the Norwegian
economy MSG.12
All the coe¢ cients in Table 2 are highly signicant. Our model is parsimoniously
parameterized relative to the amount of data, and we obtain a high goodness of t as
measured by (pseudo) R2, which varies between 90 and 92 percent depending on the
industry.13
12See Bye et al. (2006).
13The pseudo R2 is dened as:
R2 = 1  tr
dV ar(eit)
tr dV ar(byit   bdt)
where tr denotes the trace, that is, the sum of the diagonal elements.
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6.2 Exit probabilities
The most general approximation of v(St; 1), see (25), leads to weakly identied and gen-
erally insignicant parameter estimates. It is therefore necessary to obtain a more par-
simonious parameterization. Based on the AIC model selection value, we dropped some
of the terms in (25). Table 3 provides the AIC value for the di¤erent submodels. The
specication with no interaction term (;k = 0), no nonlinear term in Kit (

2k = 0) and
no linear term in it (

1 = 0) obtained for the di¤erent industries was either the lowest
AIC value or a value very close to the minimum. This is also the best model for the
pooled data, i.e., when all the industries are grouped together, whereas the most general
specication, as well as the specication with no interaction term, did not converge with
pooled data. Therefore, our specication satises ;k = 

2k = 

1 = 0. Then, combining
(24) and (25) we can rewrite (18) as:
Pr(zit = 0j Sit) = 1
1 + exp
  0t + 1kKi;t 1 + 2it 	 (28)
where 0t =  0 + 0t   1t, 1k = (s(1  )  1k) and 2 =  2. The parameter
1k of Ki;t 1 consists of two terms. The rst term is related to the scrap value of capital,
s(1  ); where s is the price of old capital relative to the purchase price of new capital.
Hence, if the scrap value of the rm increases such that the rm obtains more money if
it exits, then, cet. par., the probability to exit increases. The second term reects how
the optimal value of the rm, v(St; 1), depends on Kt 1. In Section 4, we derived that
@v(St; 1)=@Kt 1  0. That is, if the capital stock increases it becomes, cet. par., more
valuable to continue production, and the probability of exit decreases. Hence 1k > 0.
The parameter of 1k of Ki;t 1 is positive if s(1  ) > 1k. In Section 4 we also derived
that @v(St; 1)=@t  0: This suggests that 2 > 0, and hence 2 < 0; that is to say,
improved protability lowers the probability of exit.
The second column in Table 4 shows that it has a signicant negative impact on the
probability of exit. That is, the estimated value of 2 is negative in all industries, and
varies moderately across industries, ranging from  0:68 in transport equipment to  1:32
in metal products. The exponent of the corresponding power function, , is estimated to
be around 0:4 in most industries. The lowest estimate is found in plastic products (0.17)
and the highest in wood products (0.54). If we pool all six industries, the estimates of 2
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Table 3: AIC for di¤erent model specications
Industry Unrestricted ;k = 0 

;k = 

2k 

;k = 

2k
model = 1 = 0 = 

2 = 0
Wood products (20) 602:3 602:5 600:4 606:4
Plastic products (25) NA 219:1 216:3 220:0
Metal products (28) 667:4 667:4 667:5 682:1
Machinery (29) 788:2 813:0 785:5 809:0
Electrical eq. (3033) 534:2 530:5 532:8 547:5
Transport eq. (3435) 570:2 570:4 568:7 573:7
Pooled data NA NA 3706 3774
# parameters: 25 22 19 18
Not converging
Table 4: Exit probability estimates Standard errors of estimation in parentheses
Industry 1k 2 
(coe¤. of Ki;t 1) (coe¤. of 

it )
Wood products .50 (.19) -1.11 (.15) .54 (.10)
Plastic products .17 (.18) -.78 (.24) .17 (.17)
Metal products .28 (.12) -1.32 (.15) .45 (.08)
Machinery .20 (.17) -1.12 (.11) .35 (.07)
Electrical eq. .30 (.17) -.97 (.12) .32 (.10)
Transport eq. .18 (.06) -.68 (.10) .49 (.11)
Pooled data :11 (:02) -1.05 (.05) .45 (.04)
and  are  1:05 and 0:45, respectively. Both estimates are signicantly di¤erent from
zero in that the t-value of the estimate of 2 is 20 whereas the t-value of the estimate of
 is 10.
14
The column second to last in Table 5 shows the elasticity of the exit probability with
respect to operating surplus, it (for a given capital stock, Ki;t 1), that is, by how many
percent the exit probability changes  for a rm with mean values of the explanatory
variables when the operating surplus of this rm increases by one percent. The table
shows that this elasticity varies across sectors from -0.12 in plastic products to -0.69 in
wood products.
Table 4 shows that the estimate of the capital coe¢ cient, 1k, which consists of two
counteracting e¤ects (see the above discussion), is positive in all industries. It varies from
14For some rms exit may occur for other reasons than weak protability. For example, the owner of a
rm retires and decides to close down the rm because none of his family members are ready to continue
the business. In our data, we have additional information on exit in that each exit is categorized as either
bankruptcy or steered closedown. If we restrict our attention to bankruptcy, which is clearly related
to weak protability, the estimate of 2 is -0.91 when the six industries are pooled, that is, close to the
estimate when all rms (in the six industries) are included.
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Table 5: Elasticity of exit probabilities w.r.t. operating surplus and the stock
of capital
Industry Mean of Mean of Mean of Elasticity of Pr(exit)
it (r + )Kit Pr(exit) with respect to:
it Ki;t 1
Wood products .08 .35 .057 -.69 .17
Plastic products .12 .61 .046 -.12 .10
Metal products .10 .40 .029 -.62 .11
Machinery .09 .35 .051 -.43 .06
Electrical eq. .12 .37 .056 -.29 .10
Transport eq. .13 .56 .065 -.30 .10
Pooled data .10 .44 .043 -.43 .05
In millions EUR
 Calculated for a representative rm, i.e., with mean values of it and Kit
0.17 in plastic products to 0.50 in wood products, but is signicantly di¤erent from zero at
the 5 percent level in only some industries. However, the pooled estimate of 0.11 is highly
signicant, with a standard error of only 0.02. Thus, the net e¤ect of additional capital
seems to be a higher exit probability. This is as expected in that our estimates of 1
(below 0:5) suggest that the return per Euro invested in capital, it=Ki;t 1 = itK
1 1
i;t 1 ,
is strongly decreasing in Ki;t 1.
From the last column in Table 5, we can see that the elasticity of the probability to
exit with respect to Ki;t 1, that is, the impact on the exit probability of a higher stock of
capital, varies between 0.10 and 0.17 percent. The estimated elasticity from the pooled
data is only 0.05. This indicates that the impact of the scrap value of capital on exit
is only slightly stronger than the impact of improved protability (because of additional
capital) on exit, that is, s(1  ) is only slightly greater than 1k.
To evaluate the aggregate performance of our model, in each year we divide rms into
two groups: closing-down rms in year t are those that exited during t+1, and nonexiting
rms are those that did not exit during the entire observation period. Our two denitions
imply that rms exiting in t + 1 + p (p 6= 0) are not included in any of the two groups
in year t.15 For each rm we are able to estimate for each (relevant) year the exit
probability over the next year.
15As mentioned in Section 2, we study new rms that operated in at least 2 years, and we use the
rst observation year solely to obtain information about the initial capital stock of rms. This implies
that the rst possible year of exit is 1996 (i.e., rms deciding to close down at the end of 1995). Because
of lags in the registration of closedowns, we cannot identify all rms that exited during our last year of
observation, 2009; some are correctly categorized as exited, others are censored.
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Figure 3 plots annual averages of the estimated exit probability of the two groups of
rms. Our model discriminates between the two categories of rms: the exit probabilities
of the closing-down rms are generally higher than those of the nonexiting rms. However,
the di¤erences between the two groups vary a lot over time (for a given industry), with
large di¤erences in some years and quite small ones in others.
Because our estimator maximizes the probability of observing the actual data, the
result that closing-down rms have a higher estimated exit probability than nonexiting
rms may seem uninteresting. To understand our result better, consider the hypothetical
case in which all the realized variables of the rms, including exit, are assigned in a purely
random way. Then, by assumption, there is no relation between exit, protability and the
size of the capital stock (our covariates). Hence, in this constructed data set, protability
and the stock of capital will have no impact on the estimated probability of exit, and the
estimated coe¢ cients will be (approximately) zero. We nd that both protability and
the capital stock have a signicant impact on the estimated exit probability. These statis-
tically signicant relations generate a substantial di¤erence between the exit probability
of closing-down and nonexiting rms.
6.3 Survival functions
Figure 3 illustrates the di¢ culty of predicting the exit time in that the estimated exit prob-
abilities of the closing-down rms are erratic and vary a lot over time. The interpretation
of Figure 3 is, however, not straightforward as the graphs incorporate di¤erent e¤ects.
First, they reect temporal variations in both rm-specic conditions (e.g., technological
changes) and in industry-specic conditions (changes in factor prices and demand). Sec-
ond, the graphs of the closing-down rms reect a composition e¤ect as di¤erent rms
are operating in di¤erent years. That is, if entrants to the industry (on average) have a
higher exit probability than the incumbents, then (cet. par.) the average exit probability
tends to decrease over time as the share of incumbent rms will increase compared to
1995 when all rms in our sample were start-up rms.
To control for calendar time and self-selection e¤ects, we use our estimated model to
simulate survival functions. These show the probability that a rm has survived until the
end of year t as a function of time after entry and initial conditions. We construct the
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survival functions as follows. The year of entry of all the rms is referred to as year 0 (the
entry year). For each rm, we use the estimated logit model, and the values of the observed
variables, yit, in the rst year the rm is operating to calculate the exit probability, that
is, the probability of exit during the next year. We then remove a proportion of the
rms using the following procedure. For each rm, we draw a random number from the
uniform distribution [0; 1]. Firms with a number lower than its estimated exit probability
are removed. For each of the survivingrms, a new exit probability is estimated using
the estimated logit model and the values of yit in the second year the rm is contained in
the data set. Then a proportion of the rms is removed, and so on. If a rm survives
longer than in the actual data set, we use the econometric model to simulate the values
of yit.
We repeated this experiment 100 times. In general, a rm will experience many
di¤erent exit years. We use the frequency of exit years to construct the survival function
of a rm as follows. Let Zsit be an indicator function which is one if in the sth simulation
a rm i has not exited by year t. Note that Zsit = 1 is conditional on Z
s
i0 = 1 since
all rms are operative at the end of year 0. By repeated simulations, s = 1; :::; 100, a
rm-specic conditional survival function, Si(t) = P (Zit = 1jZi0 = 1;yi0) was estimated
as:
[Si(t) =
1
100
100X
s=1
Zsit.
We then grouped each rm according to whether it was an exiting rm or a nonexiting
rm (see the denitions above), and constructed survival functions for each group by
averaging the survival functions over all rms in each group; see Figure 4. By comparing
the survival functions for exiting and nonexiting rms, we can evaluate to what extent
our model is ex ante able to pickthe rms that actually exited during the observation
period. Overall, we nd that our model clearly discriminates between the two groups. For
example, for wood products, we nd that the ex ante survival probability of exiting rms
is about 35 percent after 10 years, compared with 60 percent for nonexiting rms. We
identify similar di¤erences in the other industries. These results suggest that the main
distinguishing characteristic of an exiting rm is not that its annual exit probability is
very much higher than that of a surviving rm, rather that the di¤erence in annual exit
probabilities is highly persistent. Hence, it is the cumulative e¤ect of higher annual exit
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probabilities over many years compared with the average rm that causes a rm to
exit.
6.4 Does ownership structure matter?
In line with traditional neoclassical theory, the characteristics of the owners of a rm
play no role in the above model. This may be justied in the case of listed corporations,
at least as a theoretical simplication. However, in most countries, including Norway,
closely held rms constitute by far the majority of companies. Typically, such rms as
opposed to widely held rms face nancial constraints, and must therefore rely on cash
credits and their own working capital. This may have implications for investment and
exit decisions.16 Further, owners may di¤er along a number of dimensions, for example,
gender, which may also have importance for the decisions made by the rm. The purpose
of this subsection is to apply our econometric model to test the importance of ownership
structure on rm behavior where we focus on the importance of nancial constraints and
gender di¤erences among owners.
It is widely believed that di¢ culties in raising funds limit the opportunities of indi-
viduals to set up their own business. According to Parker (2004), most start-up rms
with only private owners tend to obtain funding from the entrepreneurs themselves or
their families. According to Carrol (2001), a liquidity-constrained ownermanager may
borrow from himself or herselfby postponing dividend payments and will face a higher
discount rate the more current consumption is forsaken to undertake investment projects.
Also, in Korinek and Stiglitz (2009), investors subjective discount rate exceeds the risk-
adjusted discount rate, reecting agency problems between owners and managers of rms.
Such agency problems arise because of asymmetric information between insiders and ex-
ternal investors; see Myers and Majluf (1984). In general, a high discount factor tends to
decrease the stock of capital, that is, Ki;t 1 in our model.
There is also a widespread view that women are more risk averse than men and that
they di¤er in their emotional reaction to uncertain situations. This may be because of
biological di¤erences; see Byrnes et al. (1999) for details. Therefore, there will be gender
di¤erences in the attitudes toward risk taking; see Croson and Gneezy (2009). According
16According to Caggese (2007), nancial constraints are mostly relevant for small and privately owned
rms.
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to this literature, men also tend to be more overcondent than women, and, as a result,
may have a di¤erent (more optimistic) perception of the probability distribution of future
events. Finally, men tend to view risky situations as challenges, as opposed to women
who are more likely to interpret risky situations as threats that encourage avoidance. This
literature suggests that women tend to choose fewer (uncertain) investment projects. In
our econometric model, Ki;t 1 may therefore be lower the higher the ownership share of
women. We now proceed to test within our empirical model whether ownership concen-
tration or the gender composition of owners a¤ects investment and exit. It is expedient
to construct three indices that reect ownership concentration and gender composition in
the start-up year of the rm. Because we will examine each index sequentially, all indices
are termed oi:
First, we use a Herndahl index of owner concentration, and dene i) oi 
PN
i=1 s
2
i ;
where si is the ownership share of individual i and N is the number of individual (per-
sonal) owners of the rm. We identify both direct and indirect owners, thereby including
relatively complex ownership structures such as pyramids and ownership chains up to
three levels. We accomplish this by matching our rm data with the Shareholder Reg-
ister, which contains information about owners (both individuals and rms) and their
shareholdings. The ownership data cover the period 200109, and hence this analysis
applies only to a subsample of rms.17 Table 6 presents information on ownership con-
centration in the start-up year. The Herndahl index has a mean/median of 0.5. This
corresponds to two owners, each with a 50 percent ownership share. Hence, rms in our
sample tend to have a very high degree of owner concentration at start-up.
An alternative measure of ownership structure is ii) oi  Share of personal owners,
that is, number of shares held by individuals relative to all shares. As shown in Table 6,
this group on average owns 89 percent of the shares (the median is 100 percent). Finally,
to examine the importance of gender di¤erences, we construct the variable iii) oi  Share
of female owners > 1=3. This is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the number
of shares held by women relative to all shares is greater than one-third (the threshold for
a blocking minority). In our data, this condition is met by 9 percent of the rms. As
17Using these registers, we can identify about 85 percent of the ownership of unlisted Norwegian limited
companies. The remaining 15 percent are unidentied owners: institutions (public enterprises, ASA rms
or public funds), foreigners (these cannot be identied through a Norwegian personal number), and listed
rms. Thus, the sum of personal ownership shares in a sector may be less than one.
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shown in Table 6, the average share of female ownership is only 8 percent, whereas the
median is zero. Hence, the ownership share of female owners in these rms is generally
small.
More formally, we incorporate the e¤ects of ownership structure on investment by
adding a term, ooi, to the frictionless capital, lnKi;t 1, dened in (19), where o is an
unknown parameter to be estimated:
lnKi;t 1 = ooi + a lnAit +

c; 0

it + t: (29)
Three separate analyses are carried out, one for each operationalization of oi. If o = 0;
then there is no e¤ect of ownership or gender on investment behavior. In contrast, the
discussion above suggests that o < 0; that is, Ki;t 1 is lower, the higher is oi. The
variable oi may also a¤ect the exit probability directly. We modify the exit probability
equation as follows:
Pr(zit = 0j Sit) =
1
1 + exp
  0t + ooi + 1kKi;t 1 + 2it + 2ooi  it 	 . (30)
Here we allow oi to a¤ect the exit probability both as a rst-order e¤ect, through the
term ooi, and as an interaction e¤ect with protability, through the term 2ooi  it .
The null hypothesis to be tested is that there is no e¤ect of ownership or gender: o =
2s = 0. The term ooi may, however, pick up nonpecuniary returns to entrepreneurship
(e.g., the utility of being your own manager), which may be important to personal
owners of closely held rms   as these are often employed in the rm. This line of
reasoning suggests that o < 0 in cases i) and ii). Further, we expect that rms with a
high share of institutional ownership have easier access to equity through capital markets
than do rms held mainly by personal owners. Thus, if a rm with only a few private
owners loses its equity, it may be forced to close down because the owners may not be
able to raise new equity. Hence, we expect 2o also to be negative in cases i) and ii).
Finally, the discussion above suggests that women are more risk averse than men and may
therefore place more emphasis on negative prot shocks than men. Thus, the higher the
share of female owners, the more sensitive the exit probability to prot shocks, that is,
2o may be negative also in iii).
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Table 7 details the estimates for the pooled data of rms established in 2001 or later.
Because of the small number of rms (1,963) and exits (140), we do not present results at
the industry level. The rst row of results in Table 7 (oi  0) is comparable to the results
for pooled data reported in Table 4 (4,399 rms and 1,049 exits). All estimates of the
-coe¢ cients are close to the corresponding estimates in Table 4. Table 7 shows that the
estimated rst-order e¤ects (o and s) are clearly insignicant for all three alternative
operationalizations of oi. There is, however, a weak tendency that rms with a high
ownership concentration (the case of oi Herndahl index) respond more strongly to
changes in prot than do rms that are widely held, and also that rms with a high share
of personal owners (the case of oi  Share of personal owners) respond more strongly
to changes in prot than do rms that mainly have institutional owners. We can see this
from the negative sign of the estimates of 2s in these two cases (signicant at the 90
percent level when oi  Share of personal owners). Finally, the share of female owners
has no e¤ect on rm behavior.18
18This result is not changed if we alter the threshold in the denition of oi to 0.5, or dene oi simply
as the share of female owners.
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6.5 Policy simulations
It is important for policy makers as well as unions, management and owners of rms to
know to what extent a higher wage increases the exit probability of rms. We can use the
estimated model to shed light on this issue. Assume that there is a permanent increase
in the price of labor of  ln qL; that is, in each year the log wage is  ln qL higher than in
the base case (qLit). How would this, ceteris paribus, a¤ect the exit probabilities?
As a starting point, we x the stock of capital. Then we see from (6) that the e¤ect
measured as an elasticity of a wage increase of  ln qL on revenue and factor costs is:
ElqLRit = 2ElqLcit (31)
ElqLqMtMit = (2   %)ElqLcit
ElqLqLitLit = (2   %)ElqLcit + %,
where, from (4):
ElqLcit =
(qLit=wt)
%
(qLit=wt)
% + (qMt)
% . (32)
We nd that the elasticity of the factor price index cit with respect to the wage is on
average (across rms and calendar years) in the range 0.2 to 0.4 across the di¤erent
industries.
It is also of interest to simulate the long-run e¤ects of a wage increase, which requires
that the e¤ect on capital accumulation is taken into account. From the capital equation
(21) we obtain the following expression:
ElqLKit = ElqLKi;t 1 + (1  )cElqLcit. (33)
If the wage increase starts at the beginning of year t = 1, then ElqLK
K
i0 = 0 (as the capital
stock is predetermined at the beginning of the year), and (33) can be used recursively to
calculate the e¤ect on capital in a subsequent year of the permanent wage increase.
We now simulate the e¤ect of a 10 percent permanent wage increase ( ln qL = 0:1)
that takes place at the beginning of t = 1. The base case is the actual realization of wages
in the 10-year period 200009, while in the simulations, wages are 10 percent higher each
year. The results from the simulations are summarized in Table 8. After one year, the
survival probability decreases by one percentage point in all industries, and after 10 years
the survival probability is reduced by only 23 percentage points in most industries. The
39
exception is machinery where the survival probability is reduced by 5 percentage points
after 10 years. Nevertheless, the overall picture is that the magnitude of the e¤ects is
small for all industries.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we raised two questions: what causes rms to exit, and what are the
characteristics that distinguish exiting rms from nonexiting rms? Using a structural
econometric model, we derived explanatory variables from economic theory and estimated
models for six Norwegian export-oriented manufacturing industries. The results show that
when exit is dened as a state in which production at the site has come to a permanent
stop, increased protability signicantly lowers the exit probability, or put di¤erently, low
protability causes rms to exit. We have also found a clear di¤erence in the estimated
exit probabilities between rms that exited during the sample period (19942009) and
rms that did not exit. According to our study, exiting rms di¤er from nonexiting rms
in that their annual exit probabilities are persistently higher. Conversely, exiting rms are
not characterized by having a very high exit probability immediately prior to exit, which
reects the fact that there were no (negative) protability shocks in the last few years
prior to exit.
According to our results, an increase in the size of the capital stock increases the
probability of exit, and this e¤ect is statistically signicant in most industries. Because
the stock of capital can be a proxy for rm size, this result appears to be in conict with
the existing literature, which concludes that rm size lowers the exit probability; see the
discussion in Section 1 for details. However, our study shows the partial e¤ect of rm
size (capital) when protability is controlled for, whereas other studies typically control
for variables other than protability, for example, rm age. This reinforces our point
in Section 1 that empirical exit studies may draw false conclusions when protability
is not included in the set of covariates. In Section 2, we argue that our data suggest
a weak relationship between protability and exit. Yet, our estimation results clearly
indicate such a relationship. We believe this shows the power of econometric modeling
and methods. For example, in our model cost of adjustment, reecting that the resale
price of capital is lower than the purchasing price of new capital, is potentially a key factor
in determining exit. However, this type of cost is not included in our capital data. By
deriving an expression for the adjustment cost of capital we have been able to incorporate
this factor into the expression for the probability of rm exit.
We close by outlining some topics for future research. To start with, in the introduction
42
Figure 3: Estimated aggregate exit probabilities for nonexiting and closing-
down rms in t = 1995; :::; 2008
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Figure 4: Estimated survival probabilities as a function of rm age for nonexiting and
exiting rms
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to this paper we referred to a number of articles that have empirically documented that
the age of a rm is related to its probability of exit. However, in our derived model, age is
not specied as an explanatory variable, simply because it plays no role in the theoretical
foundation of the econometric model. Age may, however, play a role through learning
processes; see Jovanovic (1982) and Pakes and Ericson (1998). Hence, one extension of
our model would be to incorporate learning e¤ects.
A second issue that remains unsolved is the treatment of multiplant rms. These may
potentially exhibit a di¤erent relationship between protability and exit than the one we
have found. This is because a multiplant rm may take into consideration that increased
output from one plant will lower the output price, and, hence, adversely a¤ect the prof-
itability of its other plants. For example, some years ago the largest Norwegian pulp and
paper rm (Norske Skog), which owns several plants in Norway and abroad, announced
plans to close one domestic unit. According to management, although production at this
unit was protable, continued production would lower protability for the entire multi-
plant rm. Management, later supported by the majority of owners, was not even willing
to sell the unit as they feared continued production under new owners would adversely
a¤ect the rm.
This example indicates that there may not be a simple relationship between plant
protability and exit for multiplant rms. For example, shocks may induce multiplant
rms to reorganize production by closing (or opening) plants; see Reynolds (1988) and
Whinston (1988) for analyses of exit behavior of rms operating several plants. Likewise,
Bernard and Bradford Jensen (2007) employ a probit model to study exits in single and
multiplant rms in the US manufacturing industry. They nd that plants belonging
to multiplant rms are less likely to exit, but after controlling for plant and industry
attributes, these same plants are more likely to exit than are single plant rms. Similarly,
using a logit analysis, Lieberman (1990) nds that after controlling for plant size, large
multiplant rms are more likely to close plants. Hence, a topic for future research is
to examine, using a structural microeconometric framework, the closedown of plants in
multiplant rms.
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8 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 Let v(St; zt) denote net present value given St and zt:
v(St; zt) = max
It

u(St; It; zt)  t + 1
1 + r
Et [V (St+1; "t+1)]

:
(34)
Then (15) follows by denition. If zt = 0, t is the terminal period and v(St; 0) =
u(St; (1  )Kt 1; 1)  t =  c( (1  )Kt 1), which proves (16).
To prove (17), assume a nite horizon problem and let vT (St; 1) be dened in the
same way as v(St; 1) in (34), except that 1 is replaced by T in the summation limit.
That is, vT (St; zt) + t + "(zt) is the net present value in period t of choosing zt and
then make optimal decisions with regard to It and (It+k, zt+k) for k = 1; :::; T , where
t+ T is the terminal period. Thus, we consider a T -period-ahead problem. For example,
v0(St; 1) is the solution of the static problem (T = 0), v1(St; 1) is the one-period-ahead
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problem (T = 1), etc. Let VT (St; "t) denote the value function (15) corresponding to the
T -periods-ahead problem: VT (St; "t) = max
zt
[t+vT (St; zt)+"(zt)]. Obviously, v0(St; 1) =
max
It
[ c(It)]. Furthermore:
v1(St; 1) = max
It

 c(It) + 1
1 + r
Z
V0(St+1; ")h(")d" g(dSt+1jSt; It)

= max
It

 c(It) + 1
1 + r
Z
max ft+1 + v0(St+1; 0) + "(0);t+1 + v0(St+1; 1) + "(1)gh(")d"
g(dSt+1jSt; It)g
= max
It

 c(It) + 1
1 + r
Z 
t+1 +
1

ln [exp( c( (1  )Kt) + 0) + exp(v0(St+1; 1) + 1)]
g(dSt+1jSt; It)g ,
where the integrand after the last equality is the so-called social surplusfunction. The
last equality follows from (12) and a well-known property of the extreme value distribution
(see Rust, 1994). By backward recursion we obtain:
vT (St; 1) = max
It

 c(It) + 1
(1 + r)
Z 
t+1 +
1

ln [exp( c( (1  )Kt) + 0) + exp(vT 1(St+1; 1) + 1)]


g(dSt+1jSt; It)g : (35)
Under the regularity conditions of Rust (1994), equation (35) denes contraction mapping
so that:
sup
S
jvT (S; 1)  vT 1(S; 1)j ! 0 as T !1:
Then there exists a limiting function v(S; 1) that satises (17). Finally, from (15):
P (zt = 0jSt) = P (v(St; 0) + "(0) > v(St; 1) + "(1)jSt)
= P (v(St; 0) + 0 + ("(0)  0) > v(St; 1) + 1 + ("(1)  1)jSt)
=
1
1 + expf [v(St; 0)  v(St; 1) + 0   1]g
,
where in the last equation "(z)   z has a standard extreme value distribution and is
independent for z = 0; 1. Hence, (18) follows from (16).
Q.E.D.
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Proof of @v(St;1)=@Kt 1 0. We have:
@v1(St; 1)
@Kt 1
=

1
1 + r
Z h
t+11K
1 1
t (1  ) + P (zt+1 = 0jSt+1)(1  )s+
P (zt+1 = 1jSt+1)@v0(St+1; 1)
@Kt

g(dSt+1jSt; It)

 0
where we have used the envelope theorem and that @Kt
@Kt 1
= 1 . By recursion, @vT (St;1)
@Kt 1

0; and hence in the limit, @v(St;1)
@Kt 1
 0.
Q.E.D.
Appendix B: The likelihood function and the ML es-
timator
We now outline the procedure for estimation of the parameters. We partition the para-
meters as follows:  = (0; 1, 2) and  contains all the remaining parameters to be
estimated. For notational simplicity, assume that all rms enter the sample at t = 1 (the
general case is a straightforward extension). All probability statements will henceforth
be conditional on the initial capital stock, Ki0, although for simplicity this conditioning
is suppressed in the notation.
The observed data on rm i consist of fyitg; t = 1; :::;  i and fzitg; t = 2; :::;min( i +
1; T ). We will now establish the likelihood as a function of (; ).
Let ai = fai1; :::; ai; i+1g. Further, let f(aijY i; ) be the density of ai conditional on
Y i  (yi1; ::;yi i), and let f(Y i; ) be the marginal density of Y i: The position after
the semicolon is used to indicate the unknown parameters of the density. The joint log-
likelihood function l(; ) becomes:
l(; ) =
NX
i=1
li(; ) (36)
where N is the number of rms, and, reformulating (27):
li(; ) = ln
Z min( i+1;T )Y
t=2
P (zitjit, Kit; (; )) f(aijY i; )dai
+ ln f(Y i; ): (37)
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A natural estimation strategy would be to maximize the joint log-likelihood with
respect to the unknown parameters. We can then utilize that (22)(23) are formulated
in state space form, with yit as the observation vector and ai as the state vector, to
obtain f(aijY i; ) by means of the Kalman smoother. The multiple integral in (37) can
be evaluated by Monte Carlo simulations using the algorithm of Durbin and Koopman
(2002). However, the estimation problem remains complex because P(zitj it, Kit; (; ))
depends in a complex way on the parameters  and on the latent vector ai through it.
To estimate  and , we rst obtain simple preliminary estimates (; ) as follows:
 = argmax

NX
i=1
ln f(Y i; )
 = argmax

NX
i=1
min( i+1;T )X
t=2
lnP(zitj bit, Kit; (; ))
where bit is the predicted value of it obtained by replacing ait by E(aitjY i; )  this
expectation is obtained from the Kalman smoother. These are then used as starting
values when maximizing (37) jointly with respect to (; ).
We nd that the nal estimates, (b;b), are close to the initial estimates, (; ), and that
the process converges quite quickly. Visual inspection of the log-likelihood in orthogonal
directions (corresponding to the eigenvectors of the estimated covariance matrix) conrms
we have found a global maximum.
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